Reliability and Safety Modeling of a Digital  Feed-Water Control System by Kharullah, Shawkat S. & Mostfa, Ahmed A.
Journal of University of Babylon for Pure and Applied Sciences, Vol. (28), No. (1): 2020   
Online ISSN: 2312-8135, Print ISSN: 1992-0652 
The First International Scientific Conference for Pure and Human Studies, University of  
AL-HAMDANIYA, 20-21 November 2019 
 
 
 
 ةدملل ةيناسنلإاو ةفرصلا تاساردلل لولأا يملعلا يلودلا رمتؤملا20-21  يناثلا نيرشت2019  /محلا ةعماجةيناد  
© Journal of University of Babylon for Pure and Applied Sciences (JUBPAS) by University of Babylon is licensed under a Creative 
Commons Attribution 4. 0 International License, 2020. 
https://www.journalofbabylon.com/index.php/JUBPAS, info@journalofbabylon.com, jub@itnet.uobabylon.edu.iq 
 +9647823331373 (Viber and Telegram) 
 
 
284 
 
Reliability and Safety Modeling of a Digital  
Feed-Water Control System 
 
Shawkat S. Khairullah1 Ahmed A. Mostfa2 
 
1. University of Mosul, College of Engineering, Department of 
Computer Engineering. Shawkat.sabah@uomosul.edu.iq  Article Information 
Submission date: 5 /11 / 2019 
Acceptance date: 21 /5/ 2020 
Publication date: 31/ 5 / 2020 
2. University of Al Hamdaniya, College of Education, Department of 
Computer Science. mostfa@uohamdaniya.edu.iq 
   
 
 
Abstract 
 Much digital instrumentation and control systems embedded in the critical medical healthcare 
equipment, aerospace devices, and nuclear industry have obvious consequence of different failure modes. 
These failures can affect the behavior of the overall safety-critical digital system and its ability to deliver its 
dependability attributes if any defected area that could be a hardware component or software code embedded 
inside the digital system is not detected and repaired appropriately. The safety and reliability analysis of 
safety-critical systems can be accomplished with Markov modeling techniques which could express the 
dynamic and regenerative behavior of the digital control system. Certain states in the s ystem represent system 
failure, while others represent fault free behavior or correct operation in the presence of faults. This paper 
presents the development of a safety and reliability modeling of a digital feedwater control system using 
Markov-based chain models. All the Markov states and the transitions between these states were assumed 
and calculated from the control logic for the digital control system. Finally, based on the simulation results 
of modeling the digital feedwater control system, the system does meet its reliability requirement with the 
probability of being in fully operational states is 0.99 over a 6 months’ time. 
 
Keywords: instrumentation and control; safety-critical; dependability; embedded; safety; reliability ;  
feedwater; probability. 
 
I. Introduction    
      Digital control systems are a critical facet to the reliability and safety of Nuclear Power 
Plants (NPPs) operation. The control systems are continuously reading plant information 
and sending commands to actuating units [1]. The dependability analysis of these systems 
is used to increase the performance, resilience, and output capacity of the safety critica l 
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system, in particular redundant structures have been used to design robust engineer ing 
systems [1][2]. Computer-based dependable embedded systems have been designed to 
recognize and tolerate their own faults; i.e. fault-tolerant computer systems. For instance, 
Reconfiguration, the process of removing faulty components and either replacing them 
with spares or degrading to an alternate configuration. Although the capability of tolerating 
certain faults, these systems are still susceptible to different failure modes. Thus, the 
reliability of these systems must be evaluated to ensure that design requirements are met. 
Traditionally, the reliability analysis of a complex digital system consisting of many 
components has been accomplished using combinatorial mathematics. The standard "fault 
tree" method of reliability analysis is based on such mathematics. Fault tree tries to reduce 
the number of behavior to be considered in order to get the safe design. It analyzes the 
system in top-down approach trying to find the possible path of undesirable state [3]. 
Unfortunately, the fault-tree approach is incapable of analyzing systems where 
reconfiguration is possible. In reconfigurable systems the critical factor often becomes the 
effectiveness of the dynamic reconfiguration process. Dynamic fault free (DFT) however, 
is used to utilize the Architectural Analysis and Design Language (AADL) to model Digita l 
Feed-Water Control System (DFWCS) [4]. It is necessary to model such systems using the 
more powerful Markov modeling technique [5]. However, one of the disadvantages of 
Markov model is the number of attributes (states) that represent system characteristics such 
as the number of working processors. The more attributes included in the model design the 
more complex the system will be. 
       Modeling a system with Markov model require representing each state of the system 
with their attributes, which considered system characteristics. Where, the smallest set of 
attributes included in the model the less complex the system will be and can describe the 
fault behavior. The engineering for system focus design and development efforts on the 
functional behavior required under normal operating conditions and given environmenta l 
assumptions such that consideration of failure scenarios could postponed until the design 
is completed. Thus, Safety analysis should be conducted to identify possible ways to 
improve the reliability and safety in the DFWCS system [6]. The next step in the modeling 
process is to characterize the transition time from one state to another. The system 
architecture used degradable triplex system. Which means transition from one state to 
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another represents a failure with a non-constant rate. The reliability of the system is often 
faced many of such trade-off cases where real time critical systems should be conservative 
direction and represent system failure properly.  
      In this paper, the conservative approach will be used exclusively. All transitions in the 
reliability model are deducible from its architecture. This measurability is the main 
consideration in developing a model for a digital system. The transitions of a fault-tolerant 
system are divided into two categories: slow failure transitions and fast recovery 
transitions. If the states of the model are defined properly, then the slow failure transitions 
can be obtained from field data. The primary problem is to model the system so that the 
determination of these transitions is as easy as possible. If the model has many detailed 
states, the number of transitions that must be measured can be exorbitant. The paper will 
enlighten the expectations results of designing reliability and safety model of a digita l 
feedwater control system. We used the computer program SURE (Semi-Markov 
Unreliability Range Evaluator) [7][8] to solve reliability model numerically with Markov 
Model to design fault tolerant Digital Feed-Water Control System (DFWCS) used to 
control the input water level in its associated steam generator.  
 
II. Overview of the Digital Feedwater Control System 
       Digital Feed-Water Control System (DFWCS) is used to control the input water level 
in its associated steam generator [9] from approximately 1% reactor output power up to 
100% reactor output power. DFWCS is basically divided into four divisions: sensors 
module, fault-tolerant group1 module, fault-tolerant group2 module, and actuators module. 
Fault tolerance techniques based on redundancy management are typically used to detect 
the fault occurrence in digital systems. The redundancy can either be in time, or in 
hardware, which is called passive redundancy and used to identify the permanent faults 
occurring in combinational logic circuits [10].  
     The DFWCS contains a redundancy management scheme to organize the behavior of 
the system and avoid going to unsafe failure mode. For example, a duplication Main and 
Backup digital processing unit that works as a pair-of-comparing module, which can read 
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various inputs through digital sensors interfaced to processors via wired connection and 
write control outputs to the actuating unit, is used as a fault-tolerant group1. Each one of 
these two processing units use at least two types of independent error detection techniques 
such as watch dog timers and self-testing unit which both are assumed to be non-perfect. 
The monitored inputs (sensors readings of the Plant) include reactor power level, steam 
and water flow, water temperature, and water level. The digital processor outputs number 
of sets of the operating positions of two valves: Main Flow Valve (MFV) and Bypass Flow 
Valve (BFV), and the Feedwater Pump (FWP) as shown in the overview figure Fig.1 and 
in the architectural design figure Fig. 2. The Main and Backup digital processors operate 
as a redundant pair, each of which reads the inputs and deliver the outputs. In case the Main 
processor fails, the Backup processor can take over the operation of the system. The outputs 
of both the Main and Backup processors are passed to a set of four Proportion, Integral, 
and Derivative (PID) Controllers. Three of these controllers assigned to the Main Flow 
Valve (MFV), Bypass Flow Valve (BFV), and Feed-Water Pump (FWP) respective ly, 
while the fourth controller acting as a spare PID controller for either the MFV or BFV PID 
controllers, as shown in Fig. 2. If both main and backup processors fail, the PID controllers 
can operate in a manual mode.  Loss of any PID controller with both processors failed is 
system loss.  Loss of PID that is detectable leading to fail-safe shutdown and the loss of 
PID undetectable leading to fail-unsafe must be considered in the design and analysis.   
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Fig.1. Overview of the Digital Feed-Water Control System 
 
      The PID associated with each of the controlled devices performs a “reasonableness” 
check of the desired setting from the Main processor and delivers the final output to the 
controlled device. In the event that the main processor fails, and it is detected, the backup 
processor takes over. The DFWCS operates in one of two primary modes: (1) Low Power 
Control Mode, or (2) High Power Control Mode. The first mode is used when the reactor 
power is less than approximately 15% and, in this mode, the MFV is normally closed, and 
the BFV is manipulated to control the water level in the associated steam generator. The 
second mode is used when the reactor power is between approximately 15% to 100% and 
in this mode the BFV is normally closed, and the MFV is manipulated to control the water 
level in the associated steam generator.  
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Fig.2. System Architectural Design 
        
In order to increase the fault tolerance of the system, several Override Modes exist which 
under certain conditions allow the MFV or BFV to be used if the normally controlled valve 
has failed. For example, in Low Power Control Override Mode, the BFV can be bypassed 
and the MFV can be manipulated to control the water level. Given that tha basic parameters 
for the Markov model:  𝜆 = Failure transitions. C= Error detection and reconfigurat ion 
coverage. S = State. Also, other parameters can be listed as: 
fwp = Feed water pump failure rate  
FWP_pid  = PID feed water pump failure rate  
sensor_steam = Steam sensor failure rate  
sensor_WF  = Water flow sensor failure rate  
sensor_temp = Temperature sensor failure rate 
sensor_level = Water level Sensor failure rate  
sensor_RX = RX power sensor failure rate  
controller_main = Main controller failure = controller_backup = Backup controller failure rate  
MFV_pid = PID_main flow valve failure rate  
BFV_pid = PID_backup flow valve failure rate 
SPARE_pid = Spare PID_valve failure rate  
MFV = main flow valve failure rate  
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BFV =- Backup valve failure rate  
Ccontroller = Error detection mechanism coverage of the Main and backup processor, CPID = 
Error detection mechanism coverage of the PIDs (MFV and BFV) 
 = repair or reconfiguration rate of the main controller. (72 hours for permanent faults) 
(10 minutes for transient faults), sensor_Total = Sum of all the sensors failure rates =  
sensor_steam +sensor_WF + sensor_temp + sensor_leve + sensor_RX 
 
The table below shows different requirements of the altered safety integrity levels 
(SIL) in dependence to the probability of failure. The determination of probability of failure 
is extensively explained in [11]. 
 
DFWCS Component Name Failure Rate Parameter (per hour) 
Power Level Sensor   
Steam Flow Sensor   
Water Flow Sensor   
Water Temp Sensor   
Water Level Sensor   
Main processor   
Backup processor   
Main Flow Valve PID   
Bypass Flow Valve PID   
Spare PID   
Main Flow Valve   
Bypass Flow Valve   
Feed-Water Pump PID   
Feed-Water Pump   
 
 
PS
6101 
SF
6101 
WF
6105.1 
WT
6101 
WL
6101 
MC
6103.3 
BU
6103.3 
PIDFLOWMAIN __
6101 
PIDBYPASS _
6101 
PIDSPARE _
6101 
MFV
6102.1 
BFV
6101 
PIDFWP_
6101 
FWP
6101 
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III. Design Requirements and Specifications 
       The design requirement of the DFWCS control system is required to be 0.99 reliable 
over a 6-month time. Also, the probability of being in an unsafe state should be less than 
10-3. Accordingly, we classify the important states in the Markov model as operational, 
Fail-operational, Fail-safe, and Fail-unsafe. The markov model has been solved by using 
the NASA WinSURE and the NASA WinSTEM software programs. Coverage of 0.90 was 
assumed for both the processor coverage (Cc controller) and the PID coverage (Cp id) 
initially. The coverage rate was changed throughout the process of testing the model to 
observe the impact of the system reliability and system safety. The other specifications are 
listed as follows:  
a. Determine the transitions between states based on the operational narrative 
of the digital system.   
b. Assume non-perfect coverage of the error detection mechanisms.  Our 
approach to model the system should be guided by partitioning the model 
into fail safe states and fail unsafe sates. 
c. The proposed Markov model has used the NASA WinSure program, assume 
.90 coverage (initially).   
d. Then, we determine the probability of being in a failsafe at the end of 400 
hours and 4000 hours, and the probability of being in a fail unsafe at the end 
of 400, 4000 hours. 
The list of the assigned symbols and coefficients used in the Markov Model is shown in 
table 1:  
 
Table 1: Failure rates for different components for the system modeled using the 
Markov model shown in Fig. 3. 
λ 1 = λ controller_main = 3.3x10 6. 
λ 2 = λ controller_backup =3.3x10 6  
λ 3 = λ FWP_pid = 1x10 6 
λ 4 = λ MFV_pid = λ BFV_pid = λ SPARE_pid = 1x10 6  
C = C controller = C pid =0.90 
μ permanent = Controller Repair Rate = PID Repair Rate = 1/MTTR = 1/72 hr. = 0.014 repair/hr. 
μ transient = Controller Repair Rate = PID Repair Rate = 1/MTTR = 1/ 10 minutes. = 6 repair/hr. 
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IV. Approach used and its Implementation 
      To calculate the reliability and the safety of the DFWCS control system, seven states 
Markov model has been constructed. This model includes five operational states, one failed 
safe state, and one failed unsafe state as it is shown in table 2. The Markov model is 
intended to be illustrative of the typical parameters used in a analytical model [12], is 
shown in Fig. 3. The Markov model of the system is shown in Fig. 3. All the states are 
either in fully operational state, fail operational state, failsafe state, or the fail unsafe state. 
The states and the cases are illustrated in table 2: 
 
Table 2: State number and status for the Markov modeled system based on fig 3. 
State Number (1-7) State Status 
1 System Fully Operational (all the components are healthy) 
2 Fail Operational (one processor: online or spare processor fails) 
3 Fail Operational (two processors: online and spare processors fail and MFV 
PID used as a manual processor) 
4 System Fully Operational (all the components are healthy) 
5 Fail Operational (one PID: BFV or FWP PID fails) 
6 Fail Safe (two PID fail with detection, two processors and MFV PID fail with 
detection) 
(System doesn’t function and doesn’t cause harm) failure is successfully 
detected by the self-diagnostic test) 
7 Fail Unsafe (death) (two PID fail without detection, two processors and MFV 
PID fail without detection) (System doesn’t function and does cause harm) 
failure is not detected by the self-diagnostic test) 
 
      The model contains seven states that represents all cases that we have assumed for the 
system. State 1 and state 4, which both are called fully operational states; represent the case 
where all the components of the DFWCS control system are operating correctly. State 2, 
which is called fail operational state, represents the system in which either the main 
processor or the spare processor has failed, and that problem has been successfully detected 
by either the watchdog timer or the self-test process that occur inside the MFV PID. State 
3, which is called fail operational state, represents the system in which both the main 
processor and the spare processor have failed and detected correctly. In this state, the MFV 
PID has used as a manual processor. State 5, which is called fail operational state, 
represents the system in which, either the BFV PID or the FWP PID, has failed and that 
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problem has been detected and successfully corrected. State 6, that is called fail safe state, 
represents the system safely failure and controlled. A one can reached state 6 through the 
failure of two PIDs with successful detection due to the sequence of two faults, or through 
the failure of two processors and MFV PID because of the three faults sequence. State 7, 
which is called fail safe state, in which the system fails unsafely and cannot being 
controlled. A one can reached state 7 through the failure of two PIDs with successful 
detection due to the sequence of two faults or through the failure of two processors and 
MFV PID because of the tree faults sequence. 
 
Fig. 3. Transition State Diagram for a Digital Feed-Water Control System 
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Fig. 4. Simulation of Transition State Diagram for a Digital Feed-Water Control 
System using WinSURE Software program 
 
 
     The circles shown in figure Fig. 4, represent the seven different states. The reference 
numbers (17) are represent the transition state for Markov Model in the NASA WinSURE 
software. The transitions arrows include the failure rates for different components, fault 
coverage values, and repair rates [9]. The transitions illustrated on the state diagram of Fig. 
3, can be explained as follows: the transition from state 1 to state 2 can occur only if one 
of the two processors is failed (see Fig. 3), that failure is detected either by the watchdog 
timer or by the self-diagnostic of the PID, and this failure is handled correctly. Whenever 
this failure is not detected, the system will go into state 7, in which the system fails unsafe ly 
and may cause harm to the operators and the environment. The second transition from state 
2 into state 3 is occurred only if both the online processor and the spare processor are failed 
and the MFV PID is used as a manual processor to keep the functionality of the system. 
Also, the system will go into death state (State 7), if the failure of these two processors is 
not detected. After the occurrence of third sequenced fault that affect on the MFV PID, the 
system will either go into state 6 or into sate 7 based on the successful detection of the self-
diagnostic test. The transition from state 4 into state 5 can be occurred only if one PID 
either BFV or FWP is failed and detected correctly. After that, the system will become 
vulnerable to the effect of the second fault that takes the system either into state 6 or into 
sate 7, depending on the successful detection of this fault. The system is being repaired in 
three different states that are state 2, state 3, and state 5 and the repair rate in those states 
during Δt time is μ Δt. 
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The Markov model equations for the designed system can be written in matrix form, and 
as following: 
 
 Psystem (t + Δt) = Tsystem * Psystem(t) 
 
Where: Tsystem: The state transition matrix. 
 
Psystem(t): The probability of being in the corresponding state at the time t. 
 
Psystem ( t + Δt ): The probability of being in the corresponding state at the time t + Δt.  
 
V. Reliability and Safety Modeling Analysis of the DFWCS 
      The mathematical equations of the proposed markov model of the designed system can 
be written from the state diagram shown in Fig. 3. [13]. For example, the probability of the 
system being in a state 2 at time t + Δ t depends on the probability that the system was in a 
state from which it could transition to state 2 and the probability of being in that state. The 
probability equations of the Markov model and the resulted 2D state transition matrix that 
includes all the failure rates and fault coverages for the system are shown below.  
The probability that a system will be failed at some time (t + Δt) 
 
P (t + Δt) = 1 -  𝑒−𝜆 𝛥𝑡 = 𝜆 𝛥𝑡 
P1 (t + Δt) = (1 - 𝜆1 𝐶 𝛥𝑡) P1 (t) + µ 𝛥𝑡 P2 (t)  
P2 (t + Δt) = (1 – (𝜆2 + µ) 𝐶 𝛥𝑡) P2 (t) + 2 µ 𝛥𝑡 P3 (t)  
P3 (t + Δt) = (𝜆2 C 𝛥𝑡) P2 (t) + (1 – (𝜆2 + 2µ) 𝐶 𝛥𝑡) P3 (t) 
P4 (t + Δt) = (1 - 2𝜆3 C 𝛥𝑡) P4 (t) + µ 𝛥𝑡 P5 (t) 
P5 (t + Δt) = 2 𝜆3 C 𝛥𝑡 P4 (t) + (1 - (2𝜆4 +  µ ) C 𝛥𝑡) P5 (t)  
P6 (t + Δt) = 𝜆2 C 𝛥𝑡 P3 (t) + 2 𝜆4 C 𝛥𝑡 P5 (t) + P6 (t) 
P7 (t + Δt) = 𝜆1(1 −  C ) 𝛥𝑡 P1 (t) + 𝜆2 (1 - C) 𝛥𝑡 P2 (t) + 𝜆2 (1 - C) 𝛥𝑡 P3 (t) + 2𝜆3 (1 - 
C) 𝛥𝑡 P4 (t) + 2𝜆4 (1 - C) 𝛥𝑡 P5 (t) + P7 (t) 
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The equations of the discrete time Markov model for the digital feed-water control 
system can be written as:- 
P (t + Δt) = T-system P-system (t)  P (𝛥𝑡) = T-system P-system (0) 
 
   The reliability of the system: R (t) = 1- P7 (t) = P6 (t) + P5 (t) + P4 (t) + P3 (t) + P2 (t) 
+ P1 (t) 
Where:- 
 
P1 (t + Δt)− P1 (t)
𝛥𝑡
=  𝜆1 𝐶 P1(t) + µ P2 (t) 
P2 (t + Δt)− P2 (t) 
𝛥𝑡
= - (𝜆2 +  µ ) C P2 (t) + 2 µ P3 (t) 
P3 (t + Δt)− P3 (t) 
𝛥𝑡
=  𝜆2 C P2 (t) - (𝜆2 +  2µ ) C P3 (t) 
P4 (t + Δt)− P4 (t)
𝛥𝑡
=  -2𝜆3 C P4 (t) + µ P5 (t) 
P5 (t + Δt)− P5 (t)
𝛥𝑡
= 2 𝜆3 C P4 (t) + -( 2𝜆4 + µ) C P5 (t) 
P6 (t + Δt)− P6 (t) 
𝛥𝑡
=   𝜆2 C  P3 (t) +  2𝜆4 C  P5 (t) 
P7 (t +  Δt) −  P7 (t)
𝛥𝑡
 
=   𝜆1 (1 − 𝐶)P1 (t) +  𝜆2 (1 − 𝐶)P2 (t) +  𝜆2 (1 − 𝐶)P3 (t) 
+  2𝜆3 (1 − 𝐶)P4 (t) +  2𝜆4 (1 − 𝐶)P5 (t)  
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P-system (t + Δt) = 
|
|
|
P1 (t +  Δt) 
P2 (t +  Δt) 
P3 (t +  Δt) 
 
P4 (t +  Δt) 
P5 (t +  Δt) 
 
 
P6 (t +  Δt) 
P7 (t +  Δt) 
|
|
|
 
 
The two-dimensional state transition matrix of a Markov model for the system is 
P-system (t + Δt) = 
|
|
𝜆1𝐶  µ 0 0 0 0  0
0 − (𝜆2 +  µ ) C 0 0 0 0 0
0 𝜆2𝐶 − (𝜆2 +  2µ ) C 0 0 0 0
  
      0            0 0 − 2𝜆3C µ 0 0
      0            0 0 2𝜆3C − (2𝜆4 +  µ ) C 0 0
      0           0 𝜆2C 0 2𝜆4C 0 0
 
𝜆1 (1 − 𝐶) 𝜆2 (1 − 𝐶)  𝜆2 (1 − 𝐶) 2𝜆3 (1 − 𝐶) 2𝜆4 (1 − 𝐶) 0 0
|
|
 
 
P-system (t) = 
|
|
|
P0 (t) 
P1 (t) 
P2 (t) 
 
P3 (t) 
P4 (t) 
P5 (t) 
 
PFS (t) 
PFU (t) 
|
|
|
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VI. Results and Discussions 
     Digital systems have multiple failure modes that depend on the detail (state space) that 
is embedded in modeling a system [14][15]. For the designed DFWCS control system will 
be completely operational as long as the system is in one of five states: state 1, state 2, state 
3, state 4, and state 5 (see Fig. 3). As a result, the reliability of the system described by the 
seven states Markov model can be written as follows: - Reliability R (t) = P1 (t) + P2 (t) + 
P3 (t) + P4 (t) + P5 (t). However, the DFWCS control system will be safe if it is in one of 
six states: state 1, state 2, state 3, state 4, state 5, and state 6. The safety of the system 
described by the seven states Markov model can be written: Safety S (t) = P1 (t) + P2 (t) + 
P3 (t) + P4 (t) + P5 (t) + P6 (t). Reliability R (t) of a system is a function of time and is 
defined as the conditional probability that the system will perform its functions correctly 
throughout the interval [t0, t], given that the system was performing correctly at time t0. 
Safety S (t) of a system is defined as the probability that the system will either perform its 
functions correctly or will discontinue the functions in a manner that causes no harm. 
       When the “Plot” option was selected using the NASA WinSURE software program, 
the system unreliability is plotted over time. The plot shown in Fig. 5, shows that the 
probability of being in a death (unsafe) state after 400 hours is 0.00002 and the probability 
of being in a death (safe) state after 4000 hours is 0.00016. This means that the reliabil ity 
is 0.9998 as it is highlighted in table 3 (fault coverage is 0.999). The requirements of the 
assignment required that the state remain 0.99 reliable for 6 months. Therefore, the system 
does meet reliability requirements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of University of Babylon for Pure and Applied Sciences, Vol. (28), No. (1): 2020   
Online ISSN: 2312-8135, Print ISSN: 1992-0652 
The First International Scientific Conference for Pure and Human Studies, University of  
AL-HAMDANIYA, 20-21 November 2019 
 
 
 
 ةدملل ةيناسنلإاو ةفرصلا تاساردلل لولأا يملعلا يلودلا رمتؤملا20-21  يناثلا نيرشت2019  /محلا ةعماجةيناد  
© Journal of University of Babylon for Pure and Applied Sciences (JUBPAS) by University of Babylon is licensed under a Creative 
Commons Attribution 4. 0 International License, 2020. 
https://www.journalofbabylon.com/index.php/JUBPAS, info@journalofbabylon.com, jub@itnet.uobabylon.edu.iq 
 +9647823331373 (Viber and Telegram) 
 
 
299 
 
Table 3: Reliability and Safety as a function of fault coverage for the system 
modeled using the Markov model fig 3 
Fault Coverage 
result from self-
diagnostic test (C) 
Reliability R (t) 
After 6 months 
Safety S (t) Probability of being in  
Fail-safe 
Pfs (t) 
Probability of being in  
Fail-unsafe  
Pfu (t) (death) 
0.900 0.98832 0.98833371 0.00001371 0.01311 
0.920 0.98949 0.98958664 0.00009664 0.01050 
0.940 0.99201 0.99202565 0.00001565 0.00788 
0.950 0.99330 0.99331616 0.00001616 0.006578 
0.960 0.99473 0.994746692 0.000016692 0.005266 
0.980 0.99734 0.997357772 0.000017772 0.002636 
0.990 0.99866 0.998678329 0.000018329 0.001319 
0.999 0.999849 0.99986784 0.00001884 0.000131 
1 0.999981 0.999999898 0.000018898 0000000 
 
         The Probability of being in each operational state and in a death state for the digita l 
feed-water control system is shown in Fig. 6 using WinSURE Software program. The 
Probability of being in each operational state and in a death state for a digital feed-water 
control system is shown in Fig. 7 using WinSTEM Software program.  
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Fig. 5.  Probability of being in an unsafe state for a Digital Feed-Water Control 
System 
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Fig. 6. Probability of being in operational and death states for a Digital Feed-Water 
Control System using WinSURE Software program 
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Fig. 7. Probability of being in operational and death states for a Digital-Feed-Water 
Control System using WinSTEM Software program 
VII. Conclusion 
     In this paper, a conservative Markov modeling analysis for a digital feed-water control 
system (DFWCS) was presented. The computer program NASA WinSURE (Semi-Markov 
Unreliability Range Evaluator) has been used to solve reliability model numerically with 
Markov Model to design fault tolerant Digital Feed-Water Control System (DFWCS) used 
to control the input water level in its associated steam generator. The simulation results of 
modeling the digital control system proves that the proposed model has achieved the 
reliability and safety design requirements for the system with the probability of being in 
fully operational states is 0.99 over a 6 months’ time. 
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 الخلاصة
، والصناعات ت الرعاية الصحية الطبية الحيوية، وأجهزة الطيرانإن الكثير من الأجهزة الرقمية وأنظمة التحكم المضمنة في معدا 
النووية لها نتائج واضحة لأنماط الفشل المختلفة. يمكن أن تؤثر حالات الفشل هذه على سلوك النظام الرقمي الشامل للسلامة وقدرته على 
سمات الموثوقية الخاصة به إذا لم يتم الكشف عن أي منطقة معيبة يمكن أن تكون مكوًنا من مكونات الأجهزة أو رمز البرنامج المضّمن  تقديم
ف داخل النظام الرقمي وا  صلاحه بشكل مناسب. يمكن تحقيق تحليل السلامة والموثوقية للأنظمة الهامة للسلامة باستخدام تقنيات نمذجة ماركو 
، بينما تمثل حالات الات معينة في النظام فشل النظاممكن أن تعبر عن السلوك الديناميكي والتجديدي لنظام التحكم الرقمي. تمثل حالتي ي
ي أخرى سلوًكا خالًيا من الأخطاء أو عملية صحيحة في وجود أخطاء. تقدم هذه الورقة تطوير نمذجة السلامة والموثوقية لنظام التحكم الرقم
لتغذية باستخدام نماذج السلسلة القائمة على ماركوف. تم افتراض جميع حالات ماركوف والتحولات بين هذه الحالات وحسابها من في مياه ا
 تغذية ، فإن النظام يلبي متطلباتمنطق التحكم لنظام التحكم الرقمي. أخيًرا ، استناًدا إلى نتائج المحاكاة لنمذجة نظام التحكم الرقمي في مياه ال
 .أشهر 6على مدار  99.0وثوقية الخاصة به مع احتمال أن يكون في حالة التشغيل الكامل هو الم
 
